Constitutional Change

by Emese Szilágyi, Junior Research Fellow, Scientific Secretary of the Institute for Legal Studies, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences This new book, edited by two prominent Hungarian constitutional scholars, Zoltán Szente and Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz examines how the most exigent social, economic and political challenges affect constitutional adjudication at both national and European levels. More precisely, the research question was whether the most recent global challenges, such as the world economic crisis, the new wave of international terrorism or mass migration have changed the well-embedded judicial constructions or, in general, the jurisprudence of constitutional and supranational courts.
by Thomas Fleiner The sovereign decided on this Sunday on two crucial decisions, with regard to the Swiss constitution: The turnout of this vote was 54.1%. This turnout is exceptionally high for Switzerland, because the discussions mainly on the decision of the sovereign with regard to radio and television were strongly emotional. The first decision concerns a federal decision of the Swiss parliament about the financial order of Switzerland (Article196 cipher 13, 14 par 1 and 15 of the Constitution). The sovereign adopted this first decision by a majority of 84,1%; all cantons adopted this decision of the Parliament; however, the sovereign rejected the second popular initiative by a majority of  71,6% against 28.4%. 
by Fiona De Londras, Professor of Global Legal Studies, Deputy Head of Birmingham Law School The Irish Constitution can only be formally amended by referendum (Art. 46). Unlike in some jurisdictions, however, there is no formal mechanism for popular initiative: ultimately only the Oireachtas [Parliament] can propose a referendum, and the exact wording of the proposition put to the People ordinarily comes from the Attorney General. What the current developments in respect of the 8th Amendment and its potential repeal show, however, is that constitutional change in Ireland is not necessarily a technocratic, elite discourse: it can be, and in this case is being, driven by a social demand for change.
by Rasmus Smith Nielsen, PhD student The article concludes that the Danish Supreme Court in its judgment UfR 2017.824H (Ajos case) has ruled that 1) an application of the general EU principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age in Denmark together with 2) direct effect and horizontal effect of article 21 in the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 3) direct effect of law derived from TEU art. 6, section 3, would under e.g. the Danish EU accession law constitute an infringement of art. 88 of the Danish Constitution (amendment of the constitution), and 4) the European Court of Justice has according to the Danish Supreme Court, at least, before 1th December 2009 infringed the treaty (currently TEU and TFEU), cf. e.g. TEU art. 5, section 2, TEU art. 13, section 2, and TFEU art. 352.
by Zoran Oklopcic, Associate Professor at the Department of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University. While one might choose to focus on the contradictions and dissimulations which Lockean performances oftentimes require, the Catalan crisis is an occasion to ask a set of less judgmental questions: What is it that compels present-day revolutionary secessionists to follow the script intended to serve struggles against oppressive tyrants and empires, not liberal democrats and republics? What do those who follow it today expect to happen as a consequence of doing so? Or, more precisely: What are Catalans betting on as they perform the role of reasonable revolutionaries—who, in a contemporary dramatization of the Lockean script by the Catalan parliament—make ‘every effort’ to stay on the constitutional path, and who act unconstitutionally only ‘after exhausting all forms of dialogue and negotiation’? What is it that they think they must do in order to increase the chances of their bet succeeding?
by Zoran Oklopcic, Associate Professor at the Department of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University. Since the advent of popular sovereignty at the turn of the 19th century, referendums have been one of the most (excuse the pun) popular techniques of ascertaining the extent of popular support for a variety of far-reaching political projects. Oftentimes viewed as indispensable for demonstrating the legitimacy of secessionist pursuits, independence referendums have only rarely resulted in victories for advocates of the constitutional status quo. Among the 54 referendums that have taken place since the early 1800s, 43 saw the triumph of pro-independence majorities. In terms of their actual success in seceding, however, things predictably look different. Out of the victorious 43, only 22 pro-independence majorities managed to achieve independence peacefully. In the case of the remaining 21, independence either never occurred, or, when it did, took place only after a period of protracted violence.
by Thomas Fleiner. On Sunday September 24 2017, the Swiss voters decided on the following issues. The sovereign (majority of the cantons and the voters) accepted a new article 104 a concerning enough foodstuff supply with 78.7% and rejected a new Constitutional provision for a new value added tax with 52%. This concerns Article 130 par 3ter and quater (including the transitional provisions 196 par 6 and 7 linked to Article 130 of the tax amendment) tax, which supports the institution for old age survivors. The majority of the voters did also reject the legislation concerning the retirement arrangement 2020 with 52.7%. The turnaround was 46.7%. Almost all German-speaking cantons rejected a new added-value tax. Of the German-speaking cantons only Bale-town, Bern and Zurich accepted it. The French speaking cantons and the Ticino accepted it.
by Duncan Okubasu, Lecturer at Kabarak University School of Law and an Advocates of the High Court of Kenya Few minutes after Kenya’s Supreme Court (SC) nullified President Uhuru’s re-election, his lawyer- Ahmednasir Abdullahi – in a press conference described the decision as political, having nothing to do with the law. Indeed, the demand of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 that a presidential election must be determined within 14 days leaves SC judges with the constrained option of making an ‘intuitive’ decision and then following it with reasons at a later time. In the Raila v Kenyatta Case (2017), the SC completed hearing the dispute on 29 August 2017 and was expected to and did provide its ‘decision’ on 1 September 2017. It indicated in so doing that it would deliver a reasoned judgment within 21 days.

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